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I. Introduction 
 
Conversational implicatures are a species of pragmatic implication1; they are 
implications of an act of 'saying'. The speaker’s saying that p implies that q (given the 
presumption that he or she respects the norms of conversation — Grice's 'maxims' — 
or the overarching 'Cooperative Principle'). For example, the speaker’s saying that 
some students came, together with the premiss that s/he is well-informed and tries to 
be as informative as possible, implies that not all students came. (If all students had 
come, the speaker ought to have said so.) Insofar as the speaker overtly intends the 
hearer to recover those pragmatic implications of the speech act, they are part of 
what the speaker means, though not part of what the sentence means. In this way we 
can account for certain aspects of utterance meaning within pragmatics, without 
burdening semantic theory. 
Conversational implicatures thus understood have two important features. 
First, they result from an inference. Now ‘inference’ can be used in two ways : the 
broad and the narrow sense. In the strict, narrow sense, inferences satisfy what I call 
the availability condition : whoever makes an inference (in that narrow sense) is 
aware that the judgment he or she arrives at is inferentially based upon some 
previous judgment. No such condition applies to inferences in the broad sense. 
Imagine someone hearing the doorbell, and coming to believe, on that basis, that 
there is someone at the door. This example involves both an inference in the broad 
sense and an inference in the narrow sense. Identifying the sound one hears as that 
of the doorbell arguably involves an 'inference', as some cognitive scientists tell us; 
but the subject is not aware that that is so. The availability condition is not satisfied. 
                                            
1
 By 'pragmatic implication', I mean the implication of an action. 
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On the other hand, even though the subject's inference that there is someone at the 
door is spontaneous and unreflective, still it is 'available' to the subject, who knows 
that the basis for his or her judgment is the fact that the doorbell is ringing. This is an 
inference in the narrow sense, one that takes place at the personal rather than 
merely at the sub-personal level. 
Conversational implicatures, I take it, are inferences in the narrow sense: the 
subject knows that his or her judgment relative to what the speaker implies is based 
upon some independent judgment regarding what the speaker says. To take a 
standard example: if, when asked whether I can cook, I reply 'I am French', my 
utterance conversationally implicates that I can cook, and whoever understands it is 
aware that what I imply (that I can cook) 'follows from' what I say or my saying of it; 
i.e., whoever fully understands the utterance is aware of what is said, of what is 
implied, and  of the inferential connection between what is implied and (the saying of) 
what is said. 
The second feature of conversational implicatures I want to draw attention to is 
the global, post-propositional character of implicatures. Implicatures are generated 
via an inference whose input is the fact that the speaker has said that p. Hence no 
implicature can be computed unless something has been said, some proposition 
expressed. In particular, no implicature can be computed at a sub-locutionary level. 
We have to compute the truth-conditions first, so as to ascribe a definite content to 
the speaker’s speech act, before we can infer anything from that speech act. 
Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures has enjoyed a tremendous 
success since he first put it forward in the sixties; but an important change has 
occurred, initiated by Grice himself. The notion of implicature has been extended to 
cases in which neither availability nor globality is present. Those are, indeed, the 
cases that matter most to semantics. 
Consider the following examples : 
 
(1) Bill and Jane got married and had many children 
(2) Bill and Jane have three children 
 
Sentence (1) implies that Bill and Jane got married before having the children. This is 
standardly accounted for by saying that the speaker is expected to respect the maxim 
of manner, which enjoins one to be orderly and, in reporting events, to report them in 
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the order in which they occurred.2 Given that assumption, the speaker’s saying (1) 
implies that the marriage took place before the birth of the children. Sentence (2) 
similarly implies that Bill and Jane have at most three children, for if they had more 
than three children the speaker ought to have said so (in virtue of the maxim of 
quantity which he is presumed to respect). So both the upper-bounded reading of the 
numeral in (2) and the temporal reading of the conjunction in (1) are said to result 
from enriching the core meaning of the sentence with a conversational implicature. 
This is a typical use of the notion of conversational implicature in contemporary 
discussions. What I find striking, however, is the lack of the two features I mentioned 
earlier. First, the discourse participants are not aware that the alleged implicature is 
not part of literal content ; the availability condition is not satisfied, in contrast to what 
happens in the ‘I am French’ type of case. Second, the alleged implicatures seem to 
occur locally. They fall within the scope of operators, as in the following examples : 
 
(3) Bill and Jane have three or four children. 
(4) Every father feels happy if his daughter gets married and gives birth to a 
child ; much less if she gives birth to a child and gets married. 
 
In (3) the numerals are given the upper-bounded reading (exactly three or exactly 
four), but this can hardly be derived inferentially from the speaker’s saying (3) in the 
minimal sense (at least three or at least four). The strengthening seems to occur 
locally, within the scope of disjunction, rather than globally. And in (4), the temporal 
suggestion is integral to the antecedent of the conditional. This contrasts with the 
normal behaviour of implicatures, which do not fall within the scope of operators 
because they arise at the speech act level, not at the level of sub-locutionary 
constituents. 
Faced with this abnormal behaviour, one has to make room for a special class 
of implicatures (or pseudo-implicatures) which are intuitively undistinguishable from 
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 There is an alternative analysis, which does not rest on manner-based implicatures 
but on the fact that the tense features must be contextually assigned temporal values. 
(And there are other alternative analyses in the same vein.) 
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semantic content and can arise locally.3 Some theorists have appealed to the notion 
of a 'generalized' conversational implicature to handle such cases. Others have 
appealed to the distinction between genuine implicatures, which are distinct from and 
additional to what is said, and what Kent Bach has called 'conversational 
implicitures', i.e. things that are 'implicit in what is said' rather than implied by the act 
of saying it.4 My aim in this paper is to compare these (and other) approaches to the 
problem raised by what I will henceforth call 'embedded implicatures': seeming 
implicatures that arise locally, at a sub-locutionary level, without resulting from an 
inference in the narrow sense. 
 
II. Generalized Conversational Implicatures: Two Conceptions 
 
According to Grice, some conversational implicatures are 'generalized', i.e. they do 
not arise 'in virtue of special features of the context', but are normally carried by 
saying a certain thing or type of thing. The implicature arises 'in the absence of 
special circumstances', he says (Grice 1989: 37). The fact that, in a narrative, a 
conjunction such as 'They got married and had many children' is interpreted as 
mirroring the temporal order of the reported events is seen by Grice as resulting from 
a generalized conversational implicature: such an implicature is normally carried by 
an event-reporting conjunctive utterance such as (1). 
 The idea that some implicatures are generalized goes some way toward 
explaining why, in such cases, the availability condition is not satisfied. As Levinson 
puts it, generalized conversational implicatures are 'hard to distinguish from the 
semantic content of linguistic expressions, because [they are] routinely associated 
with linguistic expressions in all ordinary contexts' (Levinson 1983: 127). This 
explanation is not without its problems, but let it pass and consider how, using the 
notion of a generalized conversational implicature, we can account for the second of 
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 I assume that the two properties go together, but this is only a conjecture. In this 
paper, however, I am concerned mainly with the second property (locality). 
4
 Bach 1994. In relevance-theoretic terminology (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Carston 
2002), such things are said to be implicit constituents of the 'explicature', rather than 
implicatures. 
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the two facts noted above: the fact that the alleged implicature can arise at a sub-
sentential level, as in (4). According to Mitchell Green, the connection is 
straightforward — a generalized implicature is eo ipso embeddable: 
 
If assertion of a sentence S conveys the implicatum that p with nearly 
universal regularity, then when S is embedded the content that is usually 
understood to be embedded for semantic purposes is the proposition (S & p). 
(Green 1998: 77) 
 
But why is that so exactly? Why is a generalized implicature — or at least, one that is 
'nearly universal' — supposed to be embeddable? 
 Generalized conversational implicatures are still conversational implicatures, 
for Grice. To calculate an implicature, whether generalized or particularized, 'is to 
calculate what has to be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the 
Cooperative Principle is being observed' (Grice 1989: 39-40): The implicatures are 
inferred from the speaker's saying that p and the presumption that he is observing 
the Cooperative Principle. The only difference between generalized and 
particularized implicatures lies in the amount of contextual information needed to 
derive the implicature from the speaker's speech act. When an implicature is 
generalized, the inference goes through 'independently of information about 
particular contexts of utterance'. We know that, in general, someone who says that p 
respects the Cooperative Principle only if q — and therefore we can infer that q from 
his saying that p, without having to rely on specific information about the context of 
utterance. Thus understood the notion of a generalized conversational implicature 
(henceforth to be called a ‘Gricean’ generalized implicature or GGI) is a graded 
notion: an implicature is more or less generalized (or particularized) depending on the 
amount of information regarding the context of utterance that is necessary to derive 
the implicature. But the mechanism of the derivation is the same in all cases: the 
implicatures are inferred from the performance of the locutionary act (i.e. from the 
speaker's saying that p), given the presumption that he is observing the Cooperative 
Principle. (See Carston 2002 : 111, and the literature cited therein.) 
 In this Gricean framework, however, we cannot account for sub-sentential 
cases. If conversational implicatures are the pragmatic implications of a speech act, 
they cannot arise at a sub-locutionary level. This point was made most explicitly by 
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Ducrot. In the late sixties Ducrot had independently come up with a theory of 
implicatures very similar to Grice's (Ducrot 1969), and in the early seventies he got 
involved in an in-depth study of semantic scales (e.g. Ducrot 1973, chapter 13). 
However, contrary to Horn and Fauconnier, who were exploring the same territory, he 
and his co-author Anscombre resisted the straightforward application of Gricean 
ideas to scalar phenomena.5 The alleged scalar implicatures, they argued, cannot be 
genuine implicatures because they fall within the scope of logical operators. In 'John 
has either five or six children', the numerals take the upper-bounded reading ('John 
has either exactly five or exactly six children') rather than the minimal reading ('John 
has at least five or at least six children'), but this cannot be due to an implicature 
since the implicature in question would fall within the scope of the logical connective 
'either... or'. This, according to Anscombre and Ducrot, is impossible, in virtue of the 
following argument: 
 
(a) Conversational implicatures are pragmatic consequences of an act of saying 
something. 
(b) An act of saying something can be performed only by means of a complete 
utterance, not by means of an unasserted clause such as a disjunct or the 
antecedent of a conditional. 
(c) Hence, no implicature can be generated at the sub-locutionary level, i.e. at the 
level of an unasserted clause such as a disjunct or the antecedent of a conditional. 
(d) To say that an implicature falls within the scope of a logical operator is to say that 
it is generated at the sub-locutionary level, viz. at the level of the clause on which the 
logical operator operates. 
(e) Hence, no implicature can fall within the scope of a logical operator.  
 
It follows that in examples like (3) and (4), the alleged implicatures responsible for the 
temporal reading of the conjunction or for the upper-bounded reading of the numerals 
are not genuine implicatures; for they are not inferred from the speaker's speech act 
but are constitutive of the proposition that is the content of that act. 
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 See their collection of papers (Anscombre and Ducrot 1983), and especially their 
reply to Fauconnier 1976 (Anscombre and Ducrot 1978), reprinted therein. 
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 At this point, however, we may be tempted to change the framework and alter 
the characterization of generalized conversational implicatures. From Grice's idea 
that generalized implicatures arise in the absence of special circumstances, there is 
but a short step to the conclusion that they are generated 'by default', i.e. blindly, as 
soon as the relevant form of words is encountered. According to Horn, Gazdar, and 
especially Levinson, who took that step, generalized implicatures are default 
implicatures (DI) : they are generated automatically (without inference). They belong 
to the 'micropragmatic' rather than to the 'macropragmatic' level, in Robin Campbell's 
typology: 
 
A macropragmatic process is one constituted by a sequence of explicit 
inferences governed by principles of rational cooperation. A micropragmatic 
process develops as a cryptic [= unconscious] and heuristic procedure which 
partially replaces some macropragmatic process and which defaults to it in the 
event of breakdown. (Campbell 1981: 101) 
 
Generalized conversational implicatures, thus understood, are no longer inferred 
from the speaker's saying that p together with the presumption that the Cooperative 
Principle is being observed. They arise through a different mechanism: they are 
generated by default when the relevant linguistic trigger is encountered, unless 
something in the linguistic or extralinguistic context blocks the generation and 
'defeats' the implicature. 
 On this view generalized conversational implicatures are not merely 
generalized, they are also conventionalized: they are associated with certain 
linguistic items serving as triggers for the automatic process of implicature 
generation. That generalized implicatures tend to become conventionalized in this 
way seems natural. The conventions associating linguistic forms with DI arguably 
belong to the category of 'conventions of use', as opposed to straightforward 
'meaning conventions' (Searle 1975, Morgan 1978). They are similar to the 
conventions in virtue of which an instance of the construction 'Can you VP?' is readily 
interpreted as a request, even though literally it is a question. The derivation of the 
indirect speech act of request from the direct speech act of question is based upon 
rationality considerations of the Gricean sort, but the inference is short-circuited as a 
result of generalization and conventionalization (Bach and Harnish 1979). 
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Levinson has explicitly resisted the equation of DI to ‘standardized’ or ‘short-
circuited’ implicatures. The latter rely on compression by precedent and arise from 
routinization, he points out ; while default implicatures 'are generative, driven by 
general heuristics and are not dependent upon routinization' (Levinson 2000 : 24). 
This contrast may perhaps be interpreted as follows. Consider scalar implicatures 
(the paradigm case  of DI). They are triggered by a specific form of words only 
because (a) that form of words (e.g. ‘some’) is conventionally recognized as 
belonging to a scale (e.g. the scale <some, most, all>), and (b) there is a meta-rule 
that determines, for every pair <S, i> consisting of a scale S and an item i belonging 
to that scale, the DI associated with i. In the case of short-circuited implicatures, 
arguably, the implicature is directly associated with a particular form of words through 
routinization, without there being any ‘meta-rule’ from which the conventional 
association flows. Let us assume that this makes sense and is what Levinson has in 
mind. Despite this alleged difference between short-circuited implicatures and DI, 
Levinson acknowledges that both belong to an intermediate layer between sentence 
meaning and speaker’s meaning : 
 
According to the standard line (more often presupposed than justified) there 
are just two levels to a theory of communication : a level of sentence-meaning 
(to be explicated by the theory of grammar in the large sense) and a level of 
speaker-meaning (to be explicated by a theory of pragmatics, perhaps 
centrally employing Grice’s notion of meaningnn)… Speaker-meaning, or 
utterance-token-meaning, will be a matter of the actual nonce or once-off 
inferences made in actual contexts by actual recipients with all of their rich 
particularities.  This view, although parsimonious, is surely inadequate, indeed 
potentially pernicious, because it underestimates the regularity, recurrence, 
and systematicity of many kinds of pragmatic inferences. What it omits is a 
third layer (…) of systematic pragmatic inference based not on direct 
computations about speaker-intentions but rather on general expectations 
about how language is normally used. (Levinson 2000 : 22) 
 
The third layer involves conventions of use, in virtue of which certain forms of words, 
for one reason or another, come to be (defeasibly) associated with certain meanings 
over and above the meanings that are encoded at the first level. 
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 To sum up, we must draw a distinction between two sorts of generalized 
implicatures. Gricean generalized implicatures (GGI) are still conversational 
implicatures and, as Ducrot and others (e.g. Cohen 1971) pointed out, they cannot 
arise at the sub-sentential level. Default implicatures (DI) are conventionally 
associated with certain linguistic forms, serving as triggers. Since they arise 
automatically rather than through Gricean reasoning, they can be embedded.6 
The difference between DI and GGI is not merely the fact that DI are 
conventionally associated with certain forms of words. GGI themselves may get 
conventionalized, without ceasing to be conversational implicatures in the strict, 
Gricean sense. At a certain point, however, they will inevitably become DI. The 
transition from GGI to DI takes place when, as a result of conventionalization, a 
generalized implicature loses the property of ‘nondetachability’ which Grice uses to 
characterize conversational implicatures. 
When saying a certain thing carries a conversational implicature, Grice claims, 
it is not possible to find another way of saying the same thing — another form of 
words, with the same content — which does not also carry the implicature. This is 
nondetachability. Now the existence of linguistic triggers for an implicature does not, 
by itself, preclude its being nondetachable. If asserting a disjunctive proposition 
carries the generalized implicature that the speaker is not in a position to separately 
assert any of the disjuncts, that implicature will be carried whichever form of words is 
selected to express the disjunctive proposition in question, even if, as the result of the 
generalization of the implicature, the word 'or', which is our primary means for 
expressing disjunction, has come to be associated with the implicature and acts as a 
'trigger' for it. Still, once a certain degree of conventionalization has been reached, a 
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 Because DI-theorists such as Levinson use the Gricean label 'Generalized 
Conversational Implicature', the notion of DI is commonly (and mistakenly) ascribed 
to Grice. Thus Bart Geurts writes: 'Grice's idea seems to have been that if a 
conversational implicature  occurs often enough in the presence of an expression , 
then the implicature will somehow become conventionally associated with  itself' 
(Geurts 1998: 95-96). Note that the Gricean notion of generalized conversational 
implicature is immune to the criticisms Geurts addresses to the notion of DI and its use 
in the theory of scalars. 
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new possibility will arise. The ‘implicature’ will tend to be routinely generated even in 
configurations in which it could not result from a global inference à la Grice. That is 
how sub-sentential implicatures can be accounted for, in the revised framework. 
What starts life as a generalized implicature becomes conventionalized, and at a 
certain point is triggered even in contexts in which it could not be generated as an 
implicature via the Gricean post-propositional mechanism. At this point we no longer 
have a GGI, but a DI, characterized by the loss of the nondetachability feature. For 
consider the ‘implicature’ as it arises in a linguistic context (say, at the sub-sentential 
level) where it could not be generated via the Gricean mechanism. In such a context 
it arises only because there is a convention associating it to the form of words that 
happens to be used. Were it not for the convention of use in virtue of which the 
implicature is triggered by a certain form of words, it would not be generated, in such 
a context. It follows that, in such a context, the ‘implicature’ can be detached by 
changing the form of words that is used.7 It is no longer ‘nondetachable’. 
One might object that default implicatures, thus understood, are nothing other 
than Grice’s conventional implicatures. But that is not so. What distinguishes 
conversational implicatures from conventional implicatures, according to Grice, are 
the two properties of nondetachability and cancellability. A conversational implicature 
can always be denied, cancelled or defeated, while this is not the case for 
conventional implicatures and other aspects of semantic content. Since default 
conversational implicatures are still cancellable (defeasible), they remain distinct from 
conventional implicatures, even though they do not possess a high degree of 
nondetachability. 
 
III. From Pragmatics to Semantics 
 
                                            
7
 As Gazdar notes, 'to read off im-plicatures [i.e. default implicatures] from the 
semantic interpretation of the sentence (i.e., the proposition it expresses) would be 
impossible, since many different sentences can express a given proposition and many 
of these will not contain the scalar item and thus not carry the im-plicature ' (Gazdar 
1979 : 56). 
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Using the notion of ‘default implicature’ the two observations we started from can be 
accounted for. The default implicatures are not consciously available because they 
result from a 'cryptic and heuristic procedure', not from a macropragmatic inference 
conducted at the personal level; and they can arise locally because they are not 
generated through a global inference using as premiss the fact that the speaker has 
said that p, but are automatically triggered by certain expressions during the online 
processing of the utterance. 
In recent work, several semanticists — most prominently Fred Landman 
(2000) and Gennaro Chierchia (2001) — have endorsed the notion of a default 
implicature (as opposed to the classical, Gricean notion of an implicature). They have 
put forward detailed proposals regarding the paradigm case : scalar implicatures. 
Both Chierchia and Landman reject what Landman calls 'the Gricean Root': the idea 
that the scalar operation that derives the implicature operates on the output of the 
grammar, where the output of the grammar is the proposition expressed by the 
complete utterance. Instead, they hold that the default implicature (or at least, the 
'core' of the implicature) 'is derived at the earliest level in the grammatical derivation 
of the sentence asserted where an appropriate scale is available' (Landman 2000: 
229). As Chierchia puts it, 'implicatures are not computed after truth-conditions of 
(root) sentences have been figured out; they are computed phrase  by phrase in 
tandem with truth-conditions (or whatever compositional semantics computes)' 
(Chierchia 2001: 1). They are 'introduced locally and projected upwards in a way that 
mirrors the standard semantic recursion' (id.).8 
In Landman's framework, a numeral (or any other scalar term) is a 'scalar 
trigger', i.e. it is associated with a scale of alternatives that is exploited in generating 
default implicatures. The implicatures (or rather, their 'core') are built from that scale, 
as soon as possible in the grammatical derivation of the sentence, by negating the 
items stronger on the scale. Consider, for example, sentence (5a): 
 
 (5a) Bill believes that there were four boys at the party. 
 
We first derive the implicature-core (5c) at the level of the embedded sentence (5b): 
                                            
8
 The idea that implicatures may be computed at the phrasal level makes its first 
explicit appearance in Cornulier 1984: 663-4 (see also p. 689). 
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(5b) There were four boys at the party 
(5c) They weren't more than four boys at the party 
 
From there on, while compositionally building up the meaning of the complex 
sentence (5a), we build up simultaneously its implicature from the implicature-core 
(5c), following the semantic composition of (5a). Thus, from the level where the core 
of the implicature is derived, we successively build up the following pairs: 
 
that there were four boys at the party 
that there weren't more than four boys at the party 
 
believe that there were four boys at the party 
believe that there weren't more than four boys at the party 
 
Bill believes that there were four boys at the party 
Bill believes that there weren't more than four boys at the party 
 
The last sentence corresponds to a default implicature of (5a) that cannot be 
generated in the classical, Gricean framework. We cannot generate the scalar 
implicature 'Bill believes that there weren't more than four boys at the party' by 
negating a piece of information stronger than (5a) on some scale. The same thing 
holds for (6a), which, by default, implicates (6b): 
 
(6a) Every boy kissed three girls 
(6b) Every boy kissed not more than three girls 
 
As Landman points out, the global method leads us nowhere in a case like this. We 
cannot generate (6b) by negating a piece of information stronger than (6a) on some 
scale. To account for the scalar implicature (6b) we must give up the 'Gricean Root' 
and assume that the core of the implicature is derived before the universal quantifier 
comes into play. At an early level in the compositional process we derive the pair 
 
xn kissed three girls 
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xn kissed not more than three girls 
 
At a subsequent stage of the derivation every boy is introduced and we get: 
 
(6a) For every boy xn: xn kissed three girls 
(6b) For every boy xn: xn kissed not more than three girls 
 
Of course, the implicatures thus generated by the computational system of grammar 
remain implicatures; they can be defeated or cancelled, by all sorts of means. 
In Chierchia's framework, scalar terms and the complex expressions that 
contain them are associated with two meanings: the plain meaning of the expression, 
which is computed in the usual way, and its strengthened (upper-bounded) meaning 
which incorporates the scalar implicature. By default, the strengthened meaning is 
preferred; but the implicatures may be cancelled by the linguistic or extralinguistic 
context, in which case one falls back on the plain meaning. As in Landman's 
framework, the scalar implicatures, generated by negating the items stronger on the 
associated scale (or rather, the weakest of those items), are automatically introduced 
by the computational system of grammar, and their introduction takes place as soon 
as possible after a scalar term enters the computation. As composition proceeds, 
however, the implicatures that have been locally introduced can be filtered out. The 
originality of Chierchia's position lies in his suggestion that scalar implicatures are not 
only generated by default, but are also removed by default in certain linguistic 
contexts. The contexts in question are those that Fauconnier originally characterized 
as 'entailment reversing': negative sentences, antecedents of conditionals, and more 
generally downward-entailing environments. In such environments the plain meaning 
(without the implicature) becomes informationally stronger than the strengthened 
meaning (with the implicature), so that maintaining the implicature would lead to a 
weakening of information content. The default generation-and-removal of scalar 
implicatures therefore mimicks, within grammar, the Gricean search for maximal 
informativeness. We may perhaps think of the Gricean post-propositional mechanism 
as being the evolutionary source of the grammatical mechanism which Chierchia 
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describes. It is as if a pragmatic mechanism had been incorporated into the design of 
grammar to make it more efficient.9 
Even though it presumably evolved from a pragmatic mechanism involving the 
Gricean maxim of quantity, the default generation of scalar implicatures is not itself a 
pragmatic mechanism in the full-blooded sense: as both Landman and Chierchia 
make clear, it belongs to the computational system of grammar. In this respect 
Chierchia's and Landman's proposals are similar to that put forward by Jonathan 
Cohen in his early assault on Grice. Shortly after Grice delivered the William James 
Lectures, Cohen criticized his ‘Conversational Hypothesis’ on the grounds that it 
cannot account for embedded implicatures; and he offered his own ‘Semantical 
Hypothesis’ as a viable alternative (Cohen 1971). The Conversational Hypothesis 
says that the implicatures associated with the logical connectives result from a 
conversational inference, while Cohen’s alternative ‘Semantical Hypothesis’ says 
they are part of the meaning of the connectives. Cohen was well-aware of Grice's 
criterion, Modified Occam's Razor, which says that senses should not be multiplied 
without necessity. But he thought it was possible to ascribe a single, unequivocal 
meaning to the logical connectives, by treating certain aspects of that single meaning 
as cancellable. Thus both Grice and Cohen ascribe a single meaning to the 
connectives, in conformity to Modified Occam's Razor. According to Grice, that 
meaning can be contextually enriched as a result of a pragmatic inference; according 
to Cohen, it can be impoverished by cancelling out a defeasible aspect of that 
meaning. I understand Landman and Chierchia as putting forward an account which, 
like Cohen’s, is based on the acceptance of defeasible semantic features. Such an 
account is semantic, not pragmatic. 
At this point it is worth reflecting on what, in the overall process of interpreting 
an utterance, distinguishes the mechanisms or processes that are 'pragmatic' from 
those that are 'semantic'. 
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 Levinson speculates that such a mechanism was indeed needed to overcome what he 
calls the ‘encoding bottelneck’. 'The actual process of phonetic articulation ', he says, 
'is a bottleneck in a system that can otherwise run about four times faster ' (Levinson 
2000 : 6). The solution to the bottleneck is this : ' find a way to piggyback meaning of 
top of the meaning' (ibid.). 
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A paradigmatically pragmatic process or mechanism such as the Gricean 
generation of (classical) conversational implicatures possesses the following 
features : 
 
- it  appeals to extralinguistic information : facts regarding the situation of 
utterance or the ongoing conversation, background knowledge, etc. 
- it is ‘top down’ rather than ‘bottom-up’; that is, it is not triggered by something 
linguistic — some aspect of the linguistic signal being processed — but takes 
place in order to make sense of the communicative act performed by the 
speaker. (Note that this contrast is not the same as the previous one. A 
process may invoke extralinguistic — contextual — information while being 
linguistically triggered in a typically bottom-up manner. Indexical resolution is a 
case in point : the process of contextually assigning a value to an indexical is 
triggered by the occurrence of that indexical in the sentence, yet extralinguistic 
information is clearly and crucially involved.) 
- it is global rather than local ; that is, it is not part of the stepwise process of 
compositionally determining a semantic interpretation for the sentence, but 
takes place after the global interpretation of the sentence has been calculated. 
- it is transparent (‘available’) to the users of the language because it is a matter 
of ‘speaker’s meaning’, and speaker’s meaning is essentially overt in the 
sense glossed by Grice and his followers : the conversational protagonists 
must be consciously aware of what the speaker means, while they need not 
be consciously aware of the grammatical meaning of the expressions used, 
nor of the processes through which the meaning of the whole is determined on 
the basis of the meanings of the parts. 
- the output it delivers enriches the interpretation of the utterance in an optional 
manner ; that is, there are contexts in which the same form of words would 
carry the plain, unenriched interpretation. 
 
The default generation of scalar implicatures described by Chierchia and 
Landman (the 'DGSI', for short) possesses only the last of these features. This is not 
sufficient to make it a pragmatic process. Extralinguistic information plays no role — it 
only comes into play to defeat the default implicature or to reinstate it (to 'freeze' it) in 
case of default removal. The DGSI is clearly bottom-up : it is triggered by the 
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occurrence of scalar terms in the sentence. It takes place locally and subpersonally, 
as part of the compositional process of determining the (default) truth-conditions of 
the sentence. Those features, and especially the fact that it is linguistically triggered 
and automatic (context-independent), put the DGSI squarely on the semantic side, 
despite the optional (defeasible) character of the output. In this regard the DGSI is a 
bit like the process of indexical resolution. That process too possesses only one out 
of the five features which characterize paradigmatically pragmatic processes. As we 
have noticed in passing, the process of indexical resolution is linguistically triggered 
(bottom-up). It takes place locally and subpersonally in the derivation of the 
sentence’s truth-conditions. It is mandatory rather than optional (i.e. we have to 
assign a contextual value to the indexical, in virtue of the rules of the language). The 
only thing that is pragmatic here is the fact that contextual, extralinguistic information 
is appealed to in assigning a value to an indexical. 
The following table summarizes the similarities and contrasts between the 
three processes we have been talking about : the Gricean post-propositional 
mechanism (GPM) construed as paradigmatically pragmatic, the default calculation 
of scalar implicatures described by Landman and Chierchia (DGSI), and indexical 
resolution (IR). 
 
 Extralinguistic 
information? 
 
Personal-level 
Availability? 
Global? Top-
down? 
Optional? 
GPM yes yes yes yes yes 
DGSI no no no no yes 
IR yes no no no no 
 
 
IV. Pragmatic implications of sub-locutionary acts? 
 
Even though the classical Gricean approach cannot handle embedded implicatures, 
while the semantic approach can, one may still attempt to account for them in a 
pragmatic (rather than in a semantic) framework, by giving up some aspect of the 
Gricean picture. For example, one may construe the relevant implicatures as 
pragmatic implications of something other than a self-standing speech act. 
Recall the anti-Grice argument put forward by both Ducrot and Cohen: 
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(a) Conversational implicatures are pragmatic consequences of an act of saying 
something. 
(b) An act of saying something can be performed only by means of a complete 
utterance, not by means of an unasserted clause such as a disjunct or the 
antecedent of a conditional. 
(c) Hence, no implicature can be generated at the sub-locutionary level, i.e. at the 
level of an unasserted clause such as a disjunct or the antecedent of a conditional. 
 
It is possible to reject (b) by giving a weaker interpretation of the notion of 'saying'. 
On that interpretation, one 'says' (though one does not 'assert') something by uttering 
a disjunct or the antecedent of a conditional, and one's saying what one says may 
carry conversational implicatures. Alternatively, if one sticks to the strong 
interpretation of the notion of 'saying', according to which one does not 'say' anything 
by uttering a disjunct or the antecedent of a conditional — if, therefore, one accepts 
(b) — then one may reject (a) and claim that conversational implicatures need not be 
pragmatic implications of an act of saying (in the strong sense) but may be also 
pragmatic implications of an act of 'representing' or 'describing' — where 
representing or describing are things that can be done by means of an unasserted 
clause such as a disjunct or the antecedent of a conditional. 
The line I have just described (rejecting [a] or [b], depending on the 
intepretation that is given of the notion of 'saying') is basically that taken by Ralph 
Walker in his reply to Cohen's criticism of Grice (Walker 1975). Walker argues that 
the unasserted antecedent of a conditional is nevertheless uttered when the 
conditional is uttered; and an implicature, he says, is a pragmatic implication of an 
utterance act — not necessarily of a full-blooded illocutionary or even locutionary act. 
He writes: 
 
[The Conversational Hypothesis] holds that by a particular utterance on a 
particular occasion the speaker can convey more than his utterance strictly 
means through relying on a general recognition of Grice's Co-operative 
Principle. It is therefore concerned with utterances, whether they constitute 
self-standing speech acts or not; an utterance of a subordinate clause, as in 
the antecedent of a conditional, is still an utterance, and therefore may convey 
conversationally more than it literally means. It may convey, for example, a 
 18 
further condition on which the consequent is to be taken to depend. (Walker 
1975: 151) 
 
Consider Cohen's original example: 
 
(8) If the old King has died of a heart attack and a Republic has been 
declared, then Tom will be quite content. 
 
It involves an implicature of temporal order standardly accounted by appealing to the 
sub-maxim of orderliness, but one that, in this particular example, arises locally at the 
level of the antecedent of the conditional. (Tom will be content, on Cohen's scenario, 
only if the King died before a Republic was declared.) If Walker is right, this should 
not be a problem. The maxim of orderliness arguably demands that, in representing 
or describing sequences of events (whether assertively or not), one refrain from 
representing them in a different order than the order in which the speaker wants the 
adressee to think of them as having taken place (whether the addressee's 'thinking' 
itself is assertive thinking or mere entertaining). If the speaker wants the addressee 
to think of A as having taken place before B, he should, in virtue of the maxim, frame 
his description in such a way that the representation of A precedes the 
representation of B, that is, in  such a way that, in the discourse, A is introduced 
before B. In this way the speaker spares the hearer unnecessary efforts. Now this 
constraint is a constraint on how temporally ordered events are represented or 
described; and such representation/description of sequences of events may surely 
take place in the antecedent of conditionals, or in unasserted clauses more generally. 
Thus in (8) the antecedent contains a description of two events: the King's death, and 
the declaration of a Republic. The speaker does not assert that those events took 
place: he speaks conditionally. But the events are nonetheless described, and the 
sub-maxim of orderliness therefore applies. In virtue of the presumption that the 
speaker respects the maxims, his describing the two events in a certain order 
suggests that, when making the supposition corresponding to the antecedent of the 
conditional, the hearer is to think of those events as having taken place in that order. 
(Or at least, this suggestion will be conveyed if the temporal order of the events is 
communicationally relevant.) Uttering the antecedent therefore carries a 
conversational implicature which enriches the content of the supposition the hearer is 
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invited to make; the implicature provides, as Walker puts it, ' a further condition on 
which the consequent is to be taken to depend'. Or consider a belief report such as 
'Paul believes that the King has died and that a Republic has been declared'. The 
speaker's describing the two events in that order suggests that, according to Paul, 
they took place in that order. The speaker does not assert that they took place in that 
order (not even that they took place): he reports Paul's beliefs. Still, his describing the 
events in a certain order in reporting Paul's beliefs carries an implicature relative to 
the temporal ordering of the events in Paul's beliefs. 
In this way, with a little effort (in order to make the proposal more precise), we 
can account for some of the problematic cases. But it is not certain that the strategy I 
have outlined (following Walker) can be generalized and account for all the cases. In 
particular, it is unclear how it would apply to scalar implicatures. The scalar reasoning 
appeals to the idea that the speaker respects the maxim of quantity, i.e. gives as 
much (relevant) information as possible; now it is far from obvious that the notion of 
'giving information' can be divorced from that of asserting (or from similar notions), as 
the strategy requires. 
In some cases, admittedly, the strategy can be invoked in dealing with alleged 
scalar implicatures. For example, when the scalar term receives focal stress, the 
implicature may be construed as arising as a pragmatic implication not of the act of 
asserting or giving information, but of the sub-locutionary act of stressing a particular 
word (something that may happen in an embedded clause). By putting focal stress on 
a word, one implicates that the alternatives to that word in a contextually salient 
contrast set do not apply, i.e., that the result of substituting them for the word bearing 
focal stress would not be acceptable.10 If the word is a scalar term, the salient 
alternatives will typically be the items on the associated scale, or perhaps the items 
on the upper part of the associated scale. The resulting implicature will therefore look 
very much like a scalar implicature, even if the mechanism through which it is 
generated is quite different.11 Be that as it may, the strategy I have described, 
                                            
10
  This is a simplification. The expression in focus need not be the word actually 
bearing stress but may be a larger constituent containing it. 
11
 I think the implicatures generated by putting focal stress on a word — whether 
scalar or not — are best treated as conventional implicatures. 
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following Walker, unproblematically applies to scalar implicatures only in that sort of 
case. It is unclear that it can account for the cases in which a scalar implicature is in 
the scope of an operator without the scalar word being stressed. 
 
V. 'Local' speech acts? 
 
Alternatively, we can maintain that conversational implicatures are pragmatic 
implications of a full-blooded speech act, while rejecting the claim that no such 
speech act is performed by uttering a disjunct or the antecedent of a conditional. On 
this view the sentential parts of a complex sentence are used to perform speech acts 
of their own. Just as the complex sentence is built up from its parts, the speech act it 
serves to perform is also built up from the local speech acts which the sentential 
parts of the complex sentence are used to perform. 
The best example of that sort of move is provided by the speech-act theoretic 
analyses of conditionals put forward in the early seventies (see e.g. Ducrot 1972, 
Mackie 1973). According to these analyses, a conditional sentence 'If P, then Q' may 
be construed as serving to perform a complex speech act consisting of two local 
speech acts: a first speech act whereby the speaker makes a supposition, and a 
second speech act whereby, in the scope of that supposition, the speaker asserts 
something. The first speech act is performed by uttering 'If P', and the second speech 
act by uttering the consequent in the context created by the first speech act. In this 
framework, nothing prevents the first speech act, performed by uttering the 
antecedent, from carrying conversational implicatures of the standard sort. 
 This strategy is that which has been used by Stalnaker to solve the projection 
problem for presuppositions within a pragmatic framework (Stalnaker 1974; see also 
Karttunen 1974). Consider a conjunctive statement 'P and Q', where Q presupposes 
R. Although the presuppositions of the parts are normally inherited by the whole, 
there are cases in which the complex sentence 'P and Q' will not presuppose R — for 
example  if P itself entails R (Karttunen 1973). How can we account for that fact? 
Stalnaker offers the following explanation. The speaker who says 'P and Q' first 
asserts P and then asserts Q. For Q to presuppose R is for it to be assertable only in 
a context in which R is assumed to hold. Now the speaker's asserting P changes the 
context by adding P to the common ground, in such a way that the consequences of 
P, including R, will themselves be part of the common ground when the consequent,  
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Q, is uttered. It follows that 'P and Q' will be assertable not only in contexts in which 
R is antecedently assumed to hold, but in any context (since the presupposion 
normally carried by Q is 'internally' satisfied by the first conjunct in the complex 
sentence 'P and Q'): hence 'P and Q', contrary to 'Q', does not presuppose that R 
(i.e. it is not 'assertable only in contexts in which R is assumed to hold'). 
Stalnaker gives the same explanation for conditional sentences in which a 
presupposition of the consequent is internally satisfied by the antecedent, as in 'If 
France has a king, the king of France is bald'. Here too he describes the discourse as 
involving two speech acts: a first speech act of supposition, and an act of assertion 
performed in the temporary context created by the first speech act. The same sort of 
analysis can easily be extended to disjunctions such as 'Either France is a Republic, 
or the King of France is so shy that one never sees him in public'. 
We could adapt this analysis to our examples involving embedded 
implicatures. Faced with a difficult case such as 'John has five or six children', where 
the exactly-implicatures fall within the scope of the disjunction, we may argue that, 
just as 'P and Q' consists of two successive assertions in the Stalnakerian 
framework, 'P or Q' also consists of two successive assertions. The difference 
between 'P and Q' and 'P or Q' is that the first sequence of assertions is conjunctive, 
while the second sequence is disjunctive. To say that a sequence of two assertions is 
disjunctive is to say that the second assertion qualifies the first, and is presented as 
holding just in case the first assertion turns out to be false. 'P or Q' therefore means 
something like: 'P; but if not-P, then Q'. 
It is easy to check that, on such an analysis, we can handle embedded 
implicatures. The speaker first asserts that John has five children, thereby conveying 
the implicature that he has no more than five. Then, by saying 'Or he has six', he 
asserts that, if John does not have exactly five children, he has six (thereby 
conveying the implicature 'no more than six'). 
The problem with this analysis is that it blurs an intuitive distinction between a 
disjunctive sequence of assertions, henceforth to be called a 'disjunctive assertion', 
and the assertion of a disjunction; a distinction analogous to that between a 
conditional assertion (e.g. 'If you are hungry there are cookies in the sideboard') and 
the assertion of a conditional. As an example of disjunctive assertion, consider: 
 
John has five children. Or he  has six. 
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John has five children; or he has six. 
John has five children, or six. 
 
Here, clearly, a first assertion to the effect that John has five children is followed by a 
second assertion, introduced by 'or'. 'Or' indicates that the second assertion is an 
alternative to the first assertion. This, Cornulier suggested (1982: 88-90), can be 
cashed out by representing the content of the second assertion as a conditional 
whose antecedent is the negation of the first assertion (i.e. the negation of what it 
asserts).12 So far so good. But when I say 'John has five or six children', it does not 
seem that I first assert that John has five children and then assert that in the opposite 
case he has six. This example is most naturally understood as the assertion of a 
(single) disjunctive proposition — a reading which can be made explicit by using 
'either...or...': 'Either John has five children or he has six'. This cannot be interpreted 
as a disjunction of assertions; for the speaker at no point asserts that John has five 
children: from the very start, the proposition that John has five children is presented 
as one of the disjuncts, only the disjunction being asserted. Yet this does not prevent 
the embedded exactly-implicature from arising.  
In response to this objection, one might grant the intuitive distinction between 
a disjunctive assertion and the assertion of a disjunction (or between a conditional 
assertion and the assertion of a conditional), while holding that disjunctions, like 
conditionals, can themselves be analysed in speech-act theoretic terms. It is true 
that, when we assert a disjunction, we do not separately assert either the disjuncts. 
But the consequent of a conditional is not really asserted either, and that fact does 
not rule out a speech-act-theoretic analysis according to which the consequent is 
locally asserted, i.e. asserted in the local context set up by the supposition of the 
antecedent. The same sort of analysis in terms of local speech acts and local 
contexts might be attempted for disjunctions, and for complex utterances generally. 
But this will not do. If we treat any of the disjuncts in 'Either John has five 
children or he has six' as locally asserted, as suggested, then it is clear that the 
notion of local assertion we use is not the full-blooded speech-act-theoretic notion of 
assertion, but a semantic surrogate. This is something that has been independently 
                                            
12
 Cornulier's suggestion concerns disjunctive (or, as he put it, 'alternative') questions, 
but his proposal easily generalizes, as he himself points out (Cornulier 1982: 99-101). 
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noted in connection with the Stalnakerian analysis of conditionals. Like Ducrot and 
Mackie, Stalnaker and his followers say that when we assert a conditional, we assert 
the consequent in the local context created by uttering the antecedent. As Landman 
emphasised, however, the 'local context' in which that assertion takes place is not a 
real context: 
 
The context in which we evaluate the assertion of the consequence is not the 
actual speech context, but a context which derives from the actual speech 
context by adding the antecedent. This context is called the local context. But 
of course the consequent isn't asserted in the local context, and the local 
context isn't an actual speech context. (...) The presuppositions that derive 
from the actual assertion of the sentence in the actual speech context are 
characterized in terms of what the parts of that sentence would presuppose if 
they were asserted in a local context.13 (...) The local context is derived from 
the actual speech context, following the semantic composition of the sentence. 
This means that the notion of local context is a grammatical notion. (Landman 
2000: 237) 
 
Landman then goes on to stress the difference between the pragmatic notion of 
context standardly used in implicature theory, and the grammatical notion of local 
context used in presupposition theory: 
 
While presupposition theory has been regarded since the early seventies as 
basically a theory of local context, the notion has been all but ignored in 
implicature theory... The reason is, I think, that unlike for presuppositions, 
there is a consensus that implicatures are derived directly from the actual 
speech situation. If local context is relevant for implicature as well, this means 
that we cannot, following the Gricean Root, let the theory of co-operative 
information exchange derive them from the actual assertion of the sentence in 
the actual context. It means that we have to let the grammar derive them from 
implicatures that would be derived if its parts were asserted in a local context, 
                                            
13
 The emphasis in this sentence is mine (FR). 
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which itself is derived from the actual context following the semantic 
composition. (Landman 2000: 237) 
 
I conclude that, suitably weakened so as to avoid the confusion between a 
disjunctive (or conditional) assertion and the assertion of a disjunction (or 
conditional), the alleged speech-act-theoretic analysis inspired by Stalnaker 
collapses into a semantic analysis of the sort advocated by Chierchia and Landman. 
It is not a genuine alternative to that sort of analysis. 
 
VI. Embedded implicatures and 'free enrichment' 
 
A last strategy is available to the theorist who wants to resist the semanticization of 
embedded implicatures. It relies on the distinction between primary and secondary 
pragmatic processes (Recanati 1989, 1993, 2001, 2004). Secondary pragmatic 
processes are post-propositional inferences à la Grice: in interpreting an utterance, 
what is implied, in the intuitive sense, is inferentially derived from the speaker's 
saying what s/he says (in a way that satisfies the availability condition). In contrast, 
primary pragmatic processes are pragmatic processes at work in the very 
determination of what is said. For example, we need to assign indexicals and other 
context-sensitive expressions a contextual value in order to fix truth-conditional 
content. This contextual process of value assignment, which I call 'saturation', is 
irreducibly pragmatic: considerations relative to what the speaker means play a 
crucial role in that process. Still, it contributes to the determination of the utterance's 
semantic (truth-conditional) content, hence it counts as a 'primary' pragmatic process. 
 In contrast to secondary pragmatic processes, primary pragmatic processes 
operate locally rather than globally, and they do not satisfy the availability condition. 
In these respects they are like the default generation of implicatures. Qua pragmatic 
processes, however, they tap extralinguistic information and appeal to nonlinguistic 
abilities like the ability to decipher intentions and to make sense of actions. 
 The only primary pragmatic process that is standardly acknowledged is the 
process of saturation in virtue of which indexicals and other context-sensitive 
expressions are assigned a  contextual value. As we have seen, saturation is a 
bottom-up process (i.e. it is triggered by some element in the sentence) and it is 
mandatory (a value must be contextually provided). On the standard picture, any 
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other pragmatic process involved in interpreting an utterance is considered as 
secondary, i.e. post-propositional, in the manner of the GPM. This picture rests on 
the idea that there is pragmatics on one side and truth-conditions on the other side. 
The reason why the contribution of pragmatics to truth-conditions is allowed for in the 
case of indexicals is that the pragmatic process at stake is triggered by something 
linguistic — hence it’s not purely contextual — and it is mandatory rather than 
optional, so that it cannot be dispensed with anyway. But that is the only exception 
that is made to the principle that pragmatics has no bearing on truth-conditions. As 
Stanley puts it, 
 
All effects of extra-linguistic context on the truth-conditions of an assertion are 
traceable to elements [e.g. indexicals or free variables] in the actual syntactic 
structure of the sentence uttered. (Stanley 2000: 391) 
 
But the standard picture which this quotation illustrates has been questioned. Apart 
from the desire to keep pragmatics away from the business of determining truth-
conditions, there is no good reason to deny the existence or at least the possibility of 
primary pragmatic processes that, unlike saturation, are not linguistically but 
contextually triggered and are optional rather than mandatory. That there are such 
processes is the gist  of the alternative picture known as 'Truth-Conditional 
Pragmatics' (TCP). 
According to TCP, saturation is not the only pragmatic process that is primary 
and can affect truth-conditional content. Consider, for example, the process which 
Geoff Nunberg has dubbed 'predicate transfer' (Nunberg 1995). It takes us from a 
certain property, conventionally expressed by some predicative expression, to a 
distinct property bearing a systematic relation to it. For example, in 'I am parked out 
back', 'parked out back' undergoes predicate transfer. The property that is literally 
encoded is a property of cars (the property of being parked out back), but the 
property which the expression actually contributes to the truth-conditions in this 
utterance is not a property of cars but another, systematically related property, 
namely the property a car-owner has when his or her car has the former property. 
In contrast to saturation, the process of predicate transfer is neither mandatory 
nor bottom up. It may look as if, in an utterance such as 'I am parked out back', that 
process must take place, because there is a linguistic mismatch between the 
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predicate (which denotes a property of cars) and what it is applied to (a person). But 
type-mismatch is not necessary for predicate transfer. Just as, through transfer, 'The 
ham sandwich left without paying' is understood as saying something about the 
customer who ordered the sandwich, 'The ham sandwich stinks' can be so 
understood, in a suitable context, even though the property of stinking potentially 
applies to sandwiches as well as to customers.14 The process of transfer is not a 
linguistically controlled but a pragmatically controlled pragmatic process: it is not 
triggered by something linguistic — some aspect of the linguistic signal being 
processed — but takes place in order to make sense of the communicative act 
performed by the speaker. Moreover, it is optional: there are contexts in which the 
same form of words would carry the plain interpretation, without transfer. In some 
contexts, 'The ham sandwich stinks' talks about the sandwich; in other contexts, 
through transfer, it talks about the customer. Whether or not predicate transfer takes 
place is a wholly pragmatic matter. It is not something that is dictated by linguistic 
conventions. 
Even though the pragmatic process of predicate transfer is optional (rather 
than mandatory) and top-down (rather than bottom up), still it takes place locally and 
interferes with the process of semantic composition. In another classic example, 
'There is a lion in the courtyard', 'lion' can be understood, through transfer, in the 
representational sense: the thing that is said to be in the courtyard is not a (real) lion 
but a representation (more specifically, a statue) of lion. Now consider 'There is a 
stone lion in the courtyard'. What is said to be made of stone here? Clearly, it is the 
statue,  rather than the lion which the statue represents. This simple fact shows that 
the process of representational transfer which affects the word 'lion' must take place 
before the composition rule associated with the noun-noun construction applies to 
the semantic values of the nouns 'stone' and 'lion'.15 If predicate transfer applied 
                                            
14
 I am indebted to Dan Sperber for this example. The original ham-sandwich example 
is, of course, Nunberg's. 
15
 Note that this composition rule itself is context-sensitive (Partee 1984: 294-5). The 
denotation of the compound results from intersecting the (literal, or pragmatically 
derived) denotation of the head noun with the set of objects that bear a certain relation 
R to the (literal, or pragmatically derived) denotation of the modifying noun. That 
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globally, after the grammatically triggered composition rules have applied, the 
interpretation we would get for the noun-phrase 'a stone lion' would be something 
like: a representation of (a lion that is made of stone). But the correct interpretation is: 
(a representation of a lion) that is made of stone. We must therefore give up the 
Gricean idea that pragmatic processes operate globally on the output of the 
grammar.16 
According to TCP, just as indexical expressions are standardly assigned two 
levels of semantic value ('character' and 'content'), we must distinguish two levels of 
semantic values for ordinary, nonindexical expressions. Semantics assigns lexical 
values to simple expressions; pragmatics then optionally comes into play to 
determine the compositional values which those expressions assume in the linguistic 
and extralinguistic context in which they occur. Compositional values, not lexical 
values, are what undergo semantic composition. In other words, the composition 
rules determine the value of the whole on the basis of the pragmatically determined 
compositional values of the parts. 
Predicate transfer is only one among a family of pragmatic processes that 
have the properties I have listed: they are pragmatically controlled (top-down) rather 
than linguistically controlled (bottom-up), they are optional rather than mandatory, 
and they take place locally, thereby interacting with the compositional determination 
of truth-conditional content. This family of primary pragmatic processes I call 
'modulation', as opposed to saturation (Recanati 2004). Modulation takes as input the 
meaning of some expression (whether simple or complex) and returns as output a 
pragmatically derived meaning serving as compositional value. 
Among the processes of modulation that affect the truth-conditions of 
utterances, the most typical and pervasive is free enrichment,17 in virtue of which an 
expression is contextually given a more specific interpretation than it literally 
                                                                                                                                        
relation can only be contextually determined. In 'stone lion', 'R' is typically assigned 
the relation being made of, but in less accessible contexts a different relation will be 
assigned to the variable. 
16
 See Sag 1981 and Jackendoff 1997: 55 and 65-66 for similar points. 
17
  In the pragmatics literature this process is also called 'narrowing', 'strengthening', or 
'expansion'. (There are a couple of other labels as well.) 
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encodes. Through free enrichment an expression takes a pragmatically derived 
denotation that is a subset of the initial denotation (Carston 1997). Thus, to take 
another classic example (discussed by Nunberg and Zaenen 1992) we understand 
the mass term 'rabbit', which literally means something like rabbit stuff, as meaning 
rabbit fur in 'She wears rabbit' and rabbit meat in 'She eats rabbit'. Or, to take an 
example discussed by Searle, we understand the word 'cut' differently in 'cut the 
grass' and in 'cut the cake': 
 
Though the occurrence of the word "cut" is literal in [both] utterances..., and 
though the word is not ambiguous, it determines different sets of truth 
conditions for the different sentences. The sort of thing that constitutes cutting 
the grass is quite different from, e.g., the sort of thing that constitutes cutting a 
cake. One way to see this is to imagine what constitutes obeying the order to 
cut something. If someone tells me to cut the grass and I rush out and stab it 
with a knife, or if I am ordered to cut the cake and I run over it with a 
lawnmower, in each case I will have failed to obey the order. That is not what 
the speaker meant by his literal and serious utterance of the sentence. (Searle 
1980: 222-223) 
 
Both 'cut' and 'rabbit' are given contextually specific interpretations through free 
enrichment. Of course, the linguistic context plays an obvious role here, but free 
enrichment remains a contextually-driven (top-down) and optional process. Nothing 
prevents 'cut' in 'cut the grass' from being contextually interpreted in the sense of 
slice into strips, or 'rabbit' in 'She wears rabbit' from being interpreted in the sense of 
rabbit meat. And nothing prevents the meaning of either expression from remaining 
contextually plain and unenriched ('After the accident, there was rabbit all over the 
highway'). These properties, which free enrichment shares with the other pragmatic 
processes in the modulation family, are not exhibited by processes of the saturation 
family (indexical resolution, etc.). We must therefore complete our table and make 
room for modulation alongside the three types of process we have already described 
(the Gricean post-propositional mechanism, the default generation of scalar 
implicatures, and saturation): 
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 Extra-linguistic 
information? 
Personal-level 
Availability? 
 
Global? 
 
Top-down? 
 
Optional? 
Grice's post-
propositional 
mechanism 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Defaut generation of 
scalar implicatures 
no no no 
 
no 
 
yes 
 
Saturation (indexical 
resolution etc.) 
yes 
 
no 
 
no 
 
no 
 
no 
 
Modulation yes no no yes yes 
 
Once we acknowledge the primary pragmatic processes of modulation, a new 
approach to embedded implicatures becomes available. We can construe them as a 
particular case of free enrichment, whereby the meaning of e.g. scalar terms is 
contextually strenghtened. This is, indeed, the view which many advocates of Truth-
Conditional Pragmatics (e.g. Bach 1994, Bezuidenhout 2002) actually hold. They 
take the alleged implicatures to be 'implicitures' i.e. aspects of the proposition 
expressed which are provided by freely enriching or expanding the literal meaning of 
the sentence. The fact that the alleged implicatures fall within the scope of operators 
is taken to be the litmus test showing that they are not really conversational 
implicatures derived through the Gricean mechanism, but pragmatic constituents of 
what is said (Recanati 1989: 112-14, 1993: 269-74; Carston 2002: 191-7, 
forthcoming).  
 
VII. Conclusion: Default Implicatures or Free Enrichment (or Both)? 
 
We have seen that there are two viable approaches to embedded implicatures: a 
semantic approach in terms of default implicatures, and a pragmatic approach in 
terms of free enrichment. Which one is to be preferred? Well, I am not sure that we 
really have to choose. To conclude this paper, I will argue that the two views we have 
discussed do not necessarily stand in competition to each other. 
It is true that both theories provide an account of embedded implicatures: both 
make room for a process of strengthening that is optional and takes place locally. It is 
true also that they offer conflicting characterizations of the process in question. 
According to one theory, that process is context-independent and belongs to the 
computational system of grammar. According to the other theory,  it is a fully 
pragmatic, context-driven process. Still, I think there is no downright incompatibility 
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between these approaches, appearances notwithstanding. They are incompatible 
only if we assume that there is a single process at stake. But we cannot presuppose 
that that is so, for, as we shall see, this is one of the questions at issue in the debate. 
 DGSI-theorists argue that scalar strengthening is linguistically triggered and 
context-independent. But the default implicatures they posit can be defeated, in a 
suitable context (if they could'nt, they wouldn't be conversational implicatures). From 
the point of view of DGSI theory, the extralinguistic context plays a role at least in the 
fixation of the implicature — a contextual process which determines whether or not 
the default implicatures are defeated or (in the event of default removal) whether or 
not they are 'frozen' and maintained despite the downward entailing operator. It 
follows that there are two processes at work in the interpretation of scalar 
implicatures, and two components in the overall theory. One component belongs to 
semantics: it concerns the default generation of implicatures. The other component is 
pragmatic and concerns what happens to the defaults when the sentence is uttered 
in a real context. Since there are two components, and two processes jointly at work 
in the interpretation of scalar utterances, it may be that the two conflicting 
characterizations of 'the' local process of optional strengthening I have mentioned are 
in fact nonconflicting characterizations of two distinct processes. It may be that there 
is both a linguistically triggered, context-independent process of default generation of 
potential implicatures, and a pragmatic process of free enrichment taking as partial 
input the output of the previous process and leading to the actual strengthening of 
the meaning of the scalar term. 
Of course, one need not accept the existence of default implicatures in the first 
place: one may deny their existence and account for embedded implicatures solely in 
terms of free enrichment. Granted; one need not accept the existence of free 
enrichment either. But nothing prevents a theorist from accepting both defaut 
implicatures and free enrichment — that is my point. At bottom, there are two distinct 
questions. If we provide a positive answer to either of the two  questions, we have a 
solution to the problem of embedded implicatures. Anyone who gives a positive 
answer to one question may therefore safely give a negative answer to the other. But 
he or she does not have to give a negative answer to the other question. In other 
words, the two issues are orthogonal. 
The first of the two orthogonal issues concerns defaults. Are there default 
pragmatic values (e.g. default scalar implicatures) whose calculation is part of the 
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computational system of language? Following suggestions by Gazdar and Levinson, 
Landman and Chierchia provide an affirmative answer to this question. Sperber and 
Wilson, their followers and a few other researchers (e.g. Geurts 1998) provide a 
negative answer. The second issue concerns pragmatics, and more specifically the 
context-driven, optional processes of modulation. Are such processes primary? Do 
they operate on the meanings of the parts before the meaning of the whole is 
calculated? Do they take place locally so as to affect semantic composition? 
Advocates of Truth-Conditional Pragmatics provide an affirmative answer to this 
question. Defenders of the standard, Gricean picture give a negative answer: 
pragmatic processes are essentially global and post-propositional, they say. Unless 
they are linguistically triggered and mandatory (as saturation is), they do not affect 
truth-conditional content. 
To say that the two  issues are orthogonal is to say that there are four possible 
positions, depending on one's answer to these questions. Let me review each of 
these positions in turn. 
The first position, NN (for 'No-No'), accepts neither default pragmatic values 
nor primary pragmatic processes over and beyond saturation. It sticks to a classical 
conception of both semantic content (which does not include a defeasible layer) and 
pragmatics (which does not interfere with semantic composition). 
How, if one takes such a position, can one account for embedded 
implicatures? One has to say that they do not really exist. Thus, according to King 
and Stanley, who defend the classical view, embedded implicatures are an illusion 
(King and Stanley, forthcoming, section V). Consider the following example: 
 
(9) Eating some of the cake is better than eating all of it 
 
Here a scalar implicature seems to enrich the left-hand-side of the 'better than' 
relation. (It is better to eat some-but-not-all of the cake than to eat all of it.) This is a 
typical case of embedded implicature. King and Stanley think such examples can be 
analysed in terms merely of saturation. A statement of the form 'Better P than Q' is 
true, they say, if and only if the most similar worlds in which the left-hand-side (P) 
holds are preferable (in some contextually determined sense) to the most similar 
worlds in which the right-hand-side (Q) holds. To be evaluated, such a statement 
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requires the contextual provision of a specific similarity relation between worlds.18 
This, they think, is an instance of saturation. So they offer the following analysis, 
which dispenses with embedded implicatures. In (9) the word 'some' conveys its 
literal content (at least some), not its strengthened meaning (some but not all); but 
focussing 'some' leads the interpreter to choose a similarity relation such that the 
most similar P-worlds are worlds in which not all the cake has been eaten. In this way 
the truth-conditions of the utterance are affected as if 'some' had been given the 
upper-bounded reading (even though it has not). They conclude: 
 
By focussing the relevant word, one affects the choice of the similarity relation 
between worlds that is relevant for the truth-conditions of the "better-than" 
construction in that context. So the truth-conditions of these constructions are 
affected by scalar facts, but independently of processes such as explicature or 
implicature "intrusion". Nor does the scalar information "enrich" the semantic 
content. Rather, the truth-conditions of "better-than" sentences are sensitive to 
the choice of a similarity relation between worlds, and focus affects the choice 
of that relation. (King and Stanley, forthcoming) 
 
King and Stanley deal with the implicatures embedded in the antecedents of 
conditionals in the same way, by exploiting the context-dependence of the similarity 
relation in terms of which conditionals are standardly analysed.19 
In reply to King and Stanley, let me note, first, that focussing is not necessary 
to get the desired effect. We can say: 
 
(10) Eating some of the cake is better than eating all of it 
                                            
18
 In this respect, the 'better-than' construction is similar to conditionals, which also 
give rise to embedded implicatures. 
19
 Gazdar is the first theorist to have attempted to explain away the embedded 
implicatures of Cohen-conditionals by appealing to the context-sensitive semantics of 
conditional sentences in the Stalnaker-Lewis framework. See Gazdar 1979: 70. At the 
very end of the same book, however, Gazdar seems to revert to the view that there are 
genuine embedded implicatures in examples like (8)-(9). 
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Even though the word 'some' does not bear focal stress, still a contrast is made (by 
means of the 'better than' construction itself) between 'some' on the left-hand-side 
and 'all' on the right-hand-side. Now such a contrast makes sense only if we 
strengthen 'some' so as to get the upper-bounded reading. The notion of 'making 
sense' that comes into play here is pragmatic in the fullest possible sense (the 'top-
down' sense), hence the appeal to saturation is misguided: the process of 
strengthening takes place not because it is linguistically mandated, but in order to 
make sense of the speaker's communicative act. King and Stanley hide this fact by 
using only examples in which some formal feature of the linguistic signal (viz. the use 
of focal stress) drives the strengthening process. But this feature is not essential to 
the example — we can get rid of it, as in (10). 
King and Stanley argue that, in this particular case, the strengthening effect 
can be achieved indirectly by manipulating the similarity relation invoked by the 
'better-than' construction, rather than by directly enriching the meaning of 'some'. 
Granted; but this is, once again, a feature of the example that is accidental and 
irrelevant to the issue. We will have exactly the same strenghtening effect whichever 
construction we use, as long as it involves a contrast between 'some' and 'all'. That 
will be so, in particular, even if the construction in question does not invoke a 
similarity relation between worlds. For example we may say: 
 
John ate some of his cake but Jim ate all of his 
 
Here the scalar enrichment of 'some' takes place within the first conjunct, in the 
scope of 'but', yet it cannot be explained away in terms of some process of  
saturation that independently takes place in interpreting this construction. (There is a 
process of saturation at work in the interpretation of 'but', but I take it to be irrelevant 
to the matter at stake.) 
To conclude, the weakness of the NN position is that it offers no general 
account of embedded implicatures. It only gives us saturation-based analyses for 
particular cases — analyses which cannot be generalized because they exploit 
accidental features of the cases in question. 
 The next position is the YN ('Yes-No') view, which posits default implicatures 
but sticks to a classical conception of pragmatics as operating on the output of the 
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grammar. I take this to be Chierchia's position. This may sound paradoxical, since 
those who, like Chierchia, posit default implicatures explicitly reject the 'Gricean Root' 
and hold instead that 'pragmatic computations and grammar driven ones are 
"interspersed"' (Chierchia 2001: 1). But the pragmatic computations that are said to 
interfere with semantic composition are not genuine pragmatic processes — the sort 
of pragmatic process that TCP talks about. What DGSI theorists hold is that there is, 
in the grammar, a mechanism that calculates default implicatures. That mechanism 
operates locally. But it is not a genuine pragmatic mechanism: it is context-
independent and belongs to the linguistic system. As far as genuine pragmatics is 
concerned, a DGSI theorist may well assume a conservative conception of 
pragmatics as operating on the output of grammar (where 'grammar' now includes 
the DGSI mechanism). 
According to Chierchia, when a default implicature that has been automatically 
factored in in calculating the truth-conditions of the sentence is felt contextually 
inappropriate, some backtracking takes place and the implicature is cancelled. This 
can only happen globally — after the default truth-conditions of the utterance have 
been figured out. As Chierchia writes, 'cancellation amounts to a simple kind of 
backtracking'. The speaker computes the default meaning (truth-conditions) of the 
sentence, increments the context with the sentence thus interpreted, and if that fails, 
backtracks and gets rid of some default implicature so as to get a more acceptable 
interpretation. (An alternative procedure is to change the context through 
accommodation: see below.) 
 On the YN view, the phenomenon of embedded implicatures is accounted for 
entirely in terms of defaults. Only default implicatures can be embedded and arise 
locally; nonce implicatures cannot, for the pragmatic mechanism which yields them is 
classical, that is, globalist. This view is empirically testable. It will be prima facie 
disproved, if we can find a case in which an implicature which results from a full-
fledged pragmatic process is embedded. For example, let us consider cases in which 
some default implicature which has been suppressed because it occurs in a 
downward entailing environment is contextually reinstated ('frozen'). In such cases it 
is clear that the implicature is absent from the output of grammar (since it has been 
suppressed): its presence in the actual interpretation of the utterance is entirely due 
to the pragmatic process which overrides the default removal. If that pragmatic 
process can only be global and post-propositional, as the YN view holds, the 
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implicature in question cannot be embedded. But it is not difficult to find cases in 
which a nonce implicature is embedded. Chierchia himself gives the following 
example: 
 
(11) It was a two-course meal. But everyone who skipped the first or the second 
course enjoyed it more, for he wasn't too full to appreciate it. 
 
The disjunction ('skipped the first or the second course') occurs in a downward 
entailing environment here, so the scalar implicature which normally gives rise to the 
exclusive reading of 'or' is suppressed. In the default interpretation delivered by the 
computational system of grammar, therefore, 'or' takes the inclusive interpretation.20 
Still, the context is such that only the exclusive interpretation makes sense. As 
Chierchia says, 'we don't mean to include among the most satisfied customers, 
people who skipped both courses'. The removed implicature is therefore contextually 
reinstated. This is a genuine pragmatic process, one that, according to the YN view, 
cannot take place locally. Yet, as Chierchia notices, the scalar implicature which 
results in the exclusive reading of the disjunction in (11) cannot be accounted for by 
the global method. The implicature we would get by the global method  would be 
something like 'Not everyone who skipped the first and the second course enjoyed 
the meal more'!21 This is not at all what we want. Chierchia concludes that 'cases like 
(11) seem to constitute further evidence against globalism. We seem to be in 
presence here of an embedded scalar implicature' (p. 8). Insofar as the implicature in 
question is not produced by the computational system of grammar but by a full-
                                            
20
 Thus in a standard example like 'Every student who wrote a squib or made a 
classroom presentation got extra credit', the default interpretation of the disjunction is 
clearly inclusive. 
21
 The global method consists in first replacing the scalar term by the weakest of its 
stronger alternatives, and then negating the result. The (only) stronger alternative to 
'the first or the second course' is 'the first and the second course', so the 'global' 
implicature of 'Every one who skipped the first or the second course enjoyed the meal 
more' ought to be 'Not everyone who skipped the first and the second course enjoyed 
the meal more'. 
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fledged pragmatic mechanism, this type of example seems to show that the YN view 
cannot be right. 
Yet Chierchia sticks to the classical view of the relation between grammar and 
(genuine) pragmatics, so he has to deny that there is an embedded implicature in 
(11), appearances notwithstanding. To that effect he uses the same strategy as King 
and Stanley, and argues that we can account for the strengthening effect indirectly, 
by manipulating the domain of the quantifier through accommodation: 
 
The interpretation of (11) requires a domain of people who don't skip both 
courses. This yields the same effect that we would obtain by not removing the 
locally added implicature. (Chierchia 2001: 18) 
 
Chierchia also appeals to that strategy to handle the scalar implicatures that are 
embedded in the antecedent of conditionals (since the antecedents of conditionals 
are downward entailing environments in which scalar implicatures are removed by 
default). Thus he analyses Levinson's example (12) exactly as Gazdar or King and 
Stanley would: 
 
(12) If John has two cars, the third one parked outside must be somebody 
else's 
 
'Here too', Chierchia says, 
 
we want to accommodate in the antecedent of (12) an 'and no more' proviso. 
I.e., we want to restrict our consideration to sets of worlds from which people 
with more than two cars are excluded. The effect of this accommodation is the 
same as the computation of an implicature. But if we are right, the mechanism 
through which this happens is very different from how normally implicatures 
come about. In (12) the implicature is not added in locally. It is accommodated 
at some point to avoid a near contradiction. (Chierchia 2001: 18) 
 
The last two positions are NY and YY. NY is the view supported by relevance 
theorists. Deirdre Wilson has been the first linguist perhaps to notice the importance 
of embedded implicatures. Examples like (9)-(10), which parallel the Cohen-
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conditionals, are originally due to her (Wilson 1975: 151). Insofar as they result from 
a pragmatic process, embedded implicatures show that such processes can take 
place locally and affect truth-conditions — a theme central to relevance theory. From 
the very beginning, relevance theory has made room for primary pragmatic 
processes such as free enrichment, in terms of which embedded implicatures can 
easily be accounted for. On the other hand relevance theorists have never been 
happy with the notion of default pragmatic value. They take the alleged 'defaults' to 
be not values calculated by the language faculty independent of context, but 
pragmatic values that are determined (in the usual, context-sensitive way) in the most 
easily accessible contexts that come to mind when no specific context is otherwise 
provided. For example, one might argue that the phrase 'cut the grass' has a default 
reading (in which 'cut' is understood in the specific sense of mow) — an enriched 
reading which can be contextually overriden and which springs to mind when the 
phrase is produced 'out of the blue'. Relevance theorists would reply that, when the 
words 'cut the grass' are uttered out of the blue, a stereotypic scenario is evoked 
which is used as context (default context, we might say) and with respect to which 
the meaning of 'cut' may undergo free enrichment, thereby yielding the alleged 
default reading. The mechanism at work in producing that reading is exactly the 
same as (and is no less context-sensitive than) the mechanism at work in producing 
a context-specific reading such as slice the grass into strips in one of Searle's fancy 
scenarios.22 According to relevance theorists, the same thing goes for scalar 
implicatures: the mechanism that is responsible for the alleged 'default  implicatures' 
is exactly the same as the mechanism that is responsible for context-specific, nonce 
implicatures. 
Some work is needed on the part of relevance theorists if they want to 
substantiate their claim. For there is a significant difference between the default 
reading of 'cut the grass' and the default reading of an utterance of the form 'If P or 
Q, then R'. Chierchia cites psychological experiments by Noveck et al. (2001), 
                                            
22
 'Suppose you and I run a sod farm where we sell strips of grass turf to people who 
want a lawn in a hurry... Suppose I say to you, "Cut half an acre of grass for this 
customer"; I might mean not that you should mow it, but that you should slice it into 
strips as you could cut a cake or a loaf of bread'
 
(Searle 1980: 224-25). 
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establishing that of the two inferences that follow, the first one is overwhelmingly 
accepted, while the second one is rejected: 
 
(13a)  If P or Q, then R 
P and Q 
R 
 
(13b)  If P then Q and R 
P 
Q or R 
 
Those experiments seem to confirm that, by default, 'or' is interpreted inclusively in 
the antecedent of a conditional, but exclusively in a simple statement like the 
conclusion of (13b). This fact cannot easily be accounted for in terms of stereotypic 
scenarios. As Cherchia writes: 
 
What is interesting here is that we are dealing with abstract syllogistic frames 
with letter variables, where the only "real" words are or and if...then. Hence the 
relevant effect cannot be imputed to anything like scripts, and lexical or world 
knowledge of any kind. It must be due to the meaning of the only "real" items 
that occur in the experimental material. (p. 35) 
 
 I turn to the YY view, which has never been explicitly defended in the 
literature23 and which I'd like to advertise, in closing this paper. Like YN, YY posits 
two mechanism, one semantic (the DGSI) and the other pragmatic, but the pragmatic 
mechanism is taken to be primary rather than secondary: it interacts with the process 
of semantic composition, rather than operating on its output. To make sense of this 
position, let us consider the processing model outlined in Recanati 1995 and see how 
Chierchia's ideas could be accommodated within such a framework. 
                                            
23
 Stephen Levinson, the leading advocate of default pragmatic values, is also an 
advocate of Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (he accepts free enrichment, pragmatic 
intrusion, etc.), so he is a potential client for the YY view. 
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In that paper I argued that the three contextual processes of disambiguation, 
saturation, and modulation have the following characteristics in common. In all cases 
there are several candidates for the status of compositional value (the compositional 
value of an expression-token being what it contributes to the interpretation of the 
sentence-token where it occurs). In disambiguation the candidates are the distinct 
meanings of the ambiguous expression. In saturation the candidates are the various 
things which can be assigned, in context, to the linguistic element in need of 
saturation; for example, different referents/antecedents can be assigned to the 
pronoun 'he' in the discourse 'John was arrested by a policeman yesterday; he had 
just stolen a wallet'. In modulation the candidates are (i) the lexical value encoded by 
the word, and (ii) pragmatically derived values that are freely generated, on an 
associative basis, by applying various functions to the lexical value. In all cases, the 
candidates receive activation from multiple sources (including, but not restricted to, 
linguistic sources), and the candidate that wins (that which actually goes into the 
interpretation and assumes the status of compositional value) is that which gets the 
highest activation when the process of activation spreading stabilises. 
 The important point, for our present purposes, is that the activation which a 
candidate ultimately receives comes from several sources. One source of activation 
is linguistic. For example, it is well-known that when an ambiguous word is uttered, its 
distinct meanings, however contextually inappropriate, are automatically activated. 
This simply means that part of the activation which a given meaning receives comes 
from the fact that the word that encodes that meaning has been uttered. Activation 
also comes from other sources, of course, and if no activation comes from other 
sources the meaning in question is deactivated and loses the competition. Or 
consider modulation: the lexical value is automatically activated, and it is through the 
lexical value that the other candidates are accessed and can themselves get 
activated. But which value actually gets into the interpretation and becomes the 
compositional value depends upon the activation level reached by the various 
candidates when all sources of activation have been taken into account. The lexical 
value will get into the interpretation only if it receives enough activation from other 
sources to stay at the top of the activation ranking. 
In this light we can see the DGSI as doing two things. First, it provides further 
candidates (the strenghtened meanings) over and above the lexical values (the plain 
meanings). Second, it is a (linguistic) source of activation for the candidates — it 
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contribute a certain degree of activation to them along the lines of the Chierchia 
algorithm: the strengthened value of scalars gets a higher degree of activation unless 
a downward entailing operator is encountered, in which case the ranking is reversed 
and the plain value gets a higher ranking. Or perhaps, we should construe the 
strengthened readings as getting a higher activation than the plain readings, and the 
downward entailing operators as deactivating the strenghtened meanings of the 
scalars in their scope, so as to reverse the initial ranking.24 Whatever the details, the 
grammar will be a linguistic source of activation for both the plain meaning and the 
strengthened meaning. But this is only one source of activation, as in the other 
cases. On the overall picture, grammatical and contextual factors jointly contribute 
activation to the candidates, in such a way that a scalar term in the scope of a 
downward entailing operator may be assigned the strengthened meaning if the 
contextual activation of that meaning is higher than the deactivation resulting from 
default removal. On this 'common currency model', we don't have to construe the 
overriding of defaults as an instance of backtracking or anything of the sort. On the 
YY view, defaults are overriden locally, just as referents and indexical values are 
assigned locally.25 
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